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LIST OF ALL PARTIES
The caption of the case on appeal contains the
names of all the parties of record.

As set forth in the

brief hereafter, however, the appellant contends that the
real respondent is not the respondent of record but the
assignee of said respondent, to wit one Keith L. Gurr,
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IV
JURISDICTION OF COURT
Sec. 78-2a-3(h) U.C.A. 1953 confers jurisdiction
on this Court to hear this appeal since this is a domestic
relations case.
V
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
(1)
Exhibit

,f n

A

Whether the lower court erred in not amending

to the property settlement referred to in their

divorce decree to carry out the intent of the parties.
(Reformation.)
(2)

Whether the lower court erred in not

determining that the parties intended that the divorce
decree leave open the issue of ownership of the subject
property to be determined at a later date and in then not
determining that under the circumstances it should be
awarded now to defendant.

(Distribution of property not

disposed of by divorce decree.)
(3)

Whether the lower court erred in not amending

the decree due to changed circumstances.

(Changed

circumstances.)
(4)

Whether the lower court erred in awarding

attorneys fees to plaintiff inasmuch as the real party in
interest as to such fees was Keith L. Gurr rather than the
plaintiff.

(Attorneys fees.)
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VI
DETFRMINITIVF EXPRESS LAW
No constitutional provisions, statutes,
ordinances, rules or regulations is determinitive of the
issues in this case.
VII
STATEMENT OF CASE
Nature ot Case
The proceedings which are the subject matter of
this appeal consist of the property settlement involved in
the 1982 divorce proceeding between the parties, a money
•judgment taken thereafter in the names of both parties
which was based on certain real property concerning which
the divorce decree is silent as to its ownership and a
petition by appellant (hereinafter "perry") to amend the
divorce decree referred to above to make certain the award
to him of the property upon which the "judgment was based.
Disposition in the Court Below
The trial court denied Perry's motions to amend
the divorce decree of the parties by amending Exhibit lfAf!
to their Property Settlement and Child Custodv Agreement
for one or more of the following reasons:

(1) carry out

the intention of the parties, (2) because the decree was
deliberately intended to leave open the question of who
should be awarded the property in question pending later
developments and the later developments show that in
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fairness Perry should have that property, (3) a material
change of circumstances, to wit the subsequent assignment
to a tt\ird party, one Keith L. Gurr (hereinafter lfG\irr,f) of
the fruits of that property for 0% of the value of the
judgment.
The lower court did not expressly address the
latter two grounds urged as a basis for the relief
requested, but by implication denied Perry's requested
amendment on those grounds [given numbers (2) and (3)
above1.
The trial court also awarded Carolyn $6,765.00 in
attorney's fees.
Facts
U

FIRST ISSUE (REFORMATION)

Carolyn filed suit for divorce against Perry on
the 16th day of September, 1981 (R. 6 ) .
At the time of the divorce suit those parties were
party defendants in a law suit in Utah County (No. S0224)
filed by one Boyd Corbett and Keith Gurr and they filed a
counterclaim against those defendants and were awarded
certain real property known as The Grayson Apartments
before the divorce decree was entered Corbett v.
Fitzgerald, 709 P2d 384. (Utah, 198S).
Prior to the divorce suit Carolyn's father,
Sterling W. Sill (hereinafter "Sill") arranged through his
attorney, Allen M. Swan (hereinafter "Swan") to have

-6-

several properties owned by the Fitzgeralds transferred
into the Sterling Company, a family corporation, which
later deeded those properties to a trust set up for the
benefit of the Fitzgeralds1 nine minor children (Deposition
of Allen M. Swan, R. 141, P. 3, 4 ) . The final trust
document was dated August 6, 1982, two days before the
divorce decree was entered (Swan, P. 5). The family
residence of the Fitzgeralds in Draper had been foreclosed
upon and purchased by Carolyn's brother, David Sill, who
later deeded it to Carolyn,

Before the divorce decree was

entered it was agreed that Carolyn was to receive 25 acres
in the Cedar Valley area of Utah County, which was then
deeded to her and a house in Lehi, Utah.

The Fitzgeralds

lost the Lehi house during the divorce proceedings, so in
lieu thereof Pery's stepfather, Eric Bennion (hereinafter
II

Eric,,) , deeded one-third of an acre lot adjacent to the

family home.

It was agreed that Perry was to receive all

the remaining real property and that was itemized on an
Exhibit "A".
The agreements as to land referred to above were
incorporated, together with other matters, in various
drafts of the proposed Property Settlement and Child
Custody Agreement referred to above (Exhibits 5-P, 6-P,
7-P, 18-P, 19-P).

Carolyn's attorney, Glen Lee Rudd

(hereinafter "Rudd") prepared three drafts and on each of
them the real property, which is the subject of this
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lawsuit, to wit "2140 acres purchased from Corbett and Gurr
or Leland Fitzgerald11 hereinafter "2140 acres11) was the
first>item listed as Exhibit "A".

The final draft was sent

to Perry's counsel by letter dated May 4, 1982 (Exhibit
9-P)•

It was ^approved with certain minor changes on the

second page (which dealt with visitation rights with the
children) and mailed to Rudd.

Perry's signatiire was

notarized by Rudd on June 6, 1982 and Carolyn signed it two
days later (the same date she received the deed from Eric
referred to above) (Exhibit 18-P).
On May 11, 1982 Rudd requested by letter that the
2140 acres referred to above be deeded to the Sterling
Company for the benefit of the children (Exhibit 10-P) but
this request was not carried out (Swan, R. 141 , P* 7;
Appendix A, Par. 6, Rudd, P. 32, 33).
During discovery it was also established that
Carolyn herself was not aware of the fact that. Exhibit ,fAlf
in the court file did not include the 2140 acre property.
She testified on that point (this after Gurr started urging
her to sell out to him whatever she owned) as follows:
The Witness: Mr. Benneson (sic)
was explaining, I suppose, Perry's
position in that at the time of the
divorce that the Corbett and Gurr
property was on Exhibit "A". And he
showed me a rough draft that he had made
himself, Mr. Benneson (sic), showing
that it was on there.
And at that time, I said to him, ".I
would like it in writing, the final
copy, showing that it's still there."
-8-

And he said at that time that
"Perry was going to, or had gone down to
the City and County Building to get a
copy of the Divorce Decree to see if it
was there."
And I explained my position as far
as -- as far as the phone call from my
father and his attorney and that I would
need more proof for what actually
happened with that piece of property
before I could make a decision.
(Carolyn, R. 144, P. 25)
To be fair it should be pointed out that in the
deposition just quoted she later testified that "we (Rudd
and Carolyn) decided that whereas a decision has been made
that I would like my share of that judgment" (R. 144-, P.
72).

However, she also testified that said decision was

implemented by Ruddfs letter of May 11, 1982 and that
documents were executed to carry it out (R. 144, P. 73).
Swan testified positively it was not done.

He testified as

follows on page 7 of R. 1 M :
Q.

In connection with that, did you
read the letter that he wrote to me,
which I think is Exhibit "E"--I!ll
show you a copy of that dated May
11 , 1982?

A.

Yes, I read it.

Q.

Do you recall a reference to the
trust that we've been talking about
in that letter?

A.

I remember reading this. And I
heard Mr. Rudd make mention of it in
his deposition.

Q.

As you recall, in his deposition he
said he wasn't sure whether there
ever had been a transfer to the
trust.
-9-

A.

Yes.

I'm sure there was not.

At various times after it was discovered in
November, 1985 that the Exhibit "A" in the court file was
different from all the prior Exhibit

lf fl

A s, Carolyn told

Perry, Eric and one Joseph Sanchez that the amount of her
claim had not changed (R. 136, P. 16, P. 32, 33, P. 44,
45) .
After the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the decision
of the Fitzgeralds against Corbett and Gurr on November 1,
1985, Carolyn and her attorney met Perry and his attorney
(Eric Bennion and Joseph Sanchez were there too and the
former fixed the date as being November 25, 1985 -- R. 136,
P. 32-34.) at the Draper Bank and Trust Company and at that
time she expected that bank to pay its letter of credit
which guaranteed payment of the judgment up to $90,000.00
(Exhibit 21-P) and from that she would receive the support
money due her of $11,000.00 plus $3,500.00 and she then
asked only S3,500.00 more (R. 136, P. 47, 48 and 76, 77).
2.

SECOND ISSUE (DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY NOT

DISPOSED <0F BY DIVORCE DECREE)
Caroyln and Rudd intended that the divorce decree
would not determine ownership of the 2,140 acres in dispute
but leave the ownership for determination at a later date
(Carolyn, R. 144, P. 20, 21).
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At the time of the divorce the value of the
parties1 assets was much less than their debts. Rudd
testified on this subject (R. 136, P. 3 and Appendix A.
Par. 6, P. 35) .
Perry's income since the divorce had been so
minimal he had not even had to file income tax returns
prior to the trial of this matter (R. 136, P. 2U , 25). He
then owed sorae S4,900.00 in past due child support (Exhibit
1-D, R. 136, P. 24.) (this in addition to the $11,000.00 in
support and alimony and $2,886.22 attorney's fees paid
through Gurr) and over $50,000.00 in other debts (Exhibit
1-D) .
3.

THIRD ISSUE (CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES)

The change of circumstances that occurred between
August 8, 1082 and the petition to modify were primarily
the purchase on December 19, 1985 by Gurr of "whatever
interest, if any" Carolyn then had in the judgment of April
19, 1983 affirmed by the Supreme Court on November 1, 1985
(Gurr, R. 139, Exhibit 3). That purchase was for a price
of 0% on the dollar according to Gurr's attorney's
calculation on page 10 of his Memorandum dated April 8,
1986 (Appendix B) computed as follows:
(1)

Carolyn's interest in judgment

(2)

Carolyn's child support and
attorney's fees

(3)

Carolyn's real property claim

-11-

$38,351.35
13,720.^-2
9,616.56

(4)

Carolyn1s payment for interests
(1) through (3) above $21,500.00
(her deposition, page 19)
Total payment to Carolyn

21,500.00

Payment for (2) above Si 3,720.42
Payment for (3) above $9,616.56
$23,336.98
"Profit" Gurr made by buying (2) and
(3) with (1) thrown in "for free"

$1,836.98

In order, however, to compute the sura, if any,
Gurr paid for Carolyn's judgment interest, one would need
to back out the interest between when she was paid on
December 20, 1985 and the date of March 6, 1986 used in
Gurr's computation set forth above.
As of December 20, 1985:
(1) Carolyn1s interest in judgment
($38,351.25 (Gurr's figure above)
less 32 days (not 767 because Gurr's
interest on judgment computed only
to January 21, 1986) at $32.93 per
day ($28,322.88 divided by 860,
number of days from 4-19-83 to
1-21-86 which comes to $1,053.76
$37,297.59
(2)

Carolyn's child support and
attorney's fees ($13,720.42, less
$4,38 per day for 15 days from
December 5 to December 20, which
amounts to $65.70

$13,654.72

(3)

Carolyn's real property claim
($9,616,567 - see $1,000.00 error on
Gurr's total of $8,616.56 - less
76 days from December 20 to
March 6, 1986 at $1.91 per day,
which totals $145.16)
$9,471.40

(4)

Carolyn's payment for interests
of (1) through (3) above
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$21,500.00

Payment for (2) above $13,6 54.72
Payment for (3) above $ 9,471.40
Total for interest other than judgment

$23,126.12

Paid for "judgment interest"
Profit Gurr made by buying (2) and
(3) with (1) thrown in""for free"
4.

$1,626.12

FOURTH ISSUE (ATTORNEY'S FEES)

Carolyn was approached by Gurr through his
attorney within seven days after the judgment against him
was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court on November 1, 198S
(Corbett v. Fitzgerald, 709 P2d 384, Utah, 19«5) to sell
whatever interest, if any," she had in the judgment against
him (Gurr, R. 139, P. 15, Exhibit 3; Swan, R. 1 M , P. 8;
Appendix A, Par. 6, Rudd, P. 16). Rudd, her attorney, made
sure that she would not be liable to Gurr for any express
or implied warranties regarding any interest transferred to
Gurr (Appendix A, Par. 6, Rudd, P. 16). She had been paid
in full the $21,500.00 agreed upon (Carolyn, R. 144, P. 19)
xdhich purchased a claim against Perry of $13,720.42 for
child support and attorney's fees and a property claim
including interest of $9,616.56 (Appendix B).

Carolyn had

no financial interest at all in these proceedings including
the payment of any attorney's fees (Gurr, R. 139, P. 16).
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VIII
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1 . AS TO FIRST ISSUE (REFORMATION)
The parties intended that Perry should receive the
subject property ("21 &0 acres purchased from Corbett and
Ourr or Leland Fitzgerald") because (1) the decree states
"7.

REAL PROPERTY.

The real property acquired by the

parties during; their marriage should be distributed to the
parties as follows:
See Exhibit 'A1."

a.

Plaintiff - none,

b.

Defendant -

(2) Carolyn testified at trial that the

parties had agreed that all the Cedar Valley property
(which included the 2140 acres in question) should go to
Perry except 25 acres that she received at the time of the
divorce (R. 136, P. 47). (3) This property was not deeded
to the Sterling company as requested by Ruddfs letter of
May 11, 1Q82.

(4) Carolyn went to the Draper State Bank on

November 25, 1985 with the intention and expectation that
she would receive $11,000,00 for back child support and
alimony of $3,500.00 for the Lehi property she didn't
receive as intended by the parties (due to a title
defect).

(5) She told Perry, Eric and Joseph Sanchez after

November 1, 1985 and prior to November 25, 1985, that she
was not changing her demand due to learning that the 2140
acres were not listed in the Exhibit "A" filed with the
divorce decree.

(6) She told Perry after November 25, 1985

and prior to December 19, 1985, he'd better get her some
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money soon as she was about to "cave in" to pressure at a
time just before Christmas when she was in financial
distress.
2.

A!3 TO THE SECOND ISSUE (DISTRIBUTION OF

PROPERTY NOT DISPOSED OF LN THE DIVORCE DECREE
Since the divorce decree says Carolyn is to
receive none of the real propertv and since the subject
2140 acres (from which the judgment in question is the
fruit thereof) is not listed on the Exhibit "A" attached to
the divorce decree which listed the real property Perry was
to receive, it logically follows that this 2140 acres was
not distributed by the divorce decree and thus remained as
marital propertv that should be distributed bv clarifying
or amending the decree and a fair distribution would award
the property to Perrv in view of the marital obligations
Perry was ordered to pay (in addition to $1,000.00 per
month for alimony and child support) being "far in excess"
of the value of their assets.
3.

AS TO 7TTE THIRD ISSUE (CHANCE (W

CIRCUMSTANCES)
Due to changed circumstances here (sale of
Carolvn!s interest, if any, for $21,500.00 -- which was
less than the amount of her claim for unpaid child support,
alimony and loss of property) Perry stands to lose
$38,351.35 plus interest if the modification is not made
which the trial court has the power to grant and in equity
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should do to avoid Gurr from obtaining a "windfall gain11 as
a result of economic distress Carolyn was under just before
Christmas of 1985 when the "sale11 was made.
4.

AS TO THE FOURTH ISSUE (ATTORNEY'S FEES)

The legal services performed by Carolyn's attorney
of record in these proceedings (not her attorney in the
divorce case) were 100% for the benefit of Gurr (this same
attorney represented Gurr in the "sale" of the judgment in
question) and 0% for the benefit of Carolyn.

The real

party in interest, to wit, Gurr, not Carolyn or Perry
should pay for those services.

Gurr and Carolyn so agreed

prior to the December 19, 1985 assignment of any interest
Carolyn had in the subject judgment.
IX.
1.

ARGUMENT

REFORMATION

There are abundant precedents that the remedy of
reformation is appropriate to reform any contract so it is
consistent with the intention and agreement of the
parties.

See generally 66 Am. Jur. 2d 556, "Reformation of

Instruments11 Sec. 29 et seq.
Several recent Utah Supreme Court cases have dealt
with this subject.

In Hattinger v. Jensen, 684 P2d 1271

(Utah, 1984) the Court granted reformation of a deed even
after the property had been sold where the purchaser had at
least constructive notice of the error in the deed.

In

Rriggs v. Liddell, 669 P2d 770 (Utah, 1985) reformation was
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denied because the mistake, if any, was only unilateral.
Absent fraud both parties must have intended a result
different than that embodied in the instrument in question.
In the instant case Perry gave direct testimony
that the Exhibit "A" to the divorce decree was contrary to
his intent (R. 136, P. 5)• Carolyn testified to the same
effect without direct reference to Exhibit "A11.

At page 47

of the transcript of the trial (R. 136) she testified as
follows:
Q.

Mrs. Knepper, at the time that you
were negotiating for settling your
property rights wasn't it true that
it was agreed that all the Cedar
Valley property should go to Mr.
Fitzgerald except twenty-five acres
which you received?

A. Yes.
Q.

When did you receive the twenty-five
acres?

A.

At the time of the divorce.

Since the subject 2140 acres are in Cedar Valley
(R. 144, P. 43) it is clear that Exhibit "A" did not
represent Carolyn's intention any more than it did
Perry's.

Thus the mistake was mutual and equity requires

reformation of Exhibit "A".
The foregoing mistake as to Carolyn is further
corroborated by additional clear and convincing evidence
which consists of the following circumstantial evidence:
(1) Rudd, Carolyn's attorney, had the ?140 acres set forth
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on every copy of the Exhibit "A11 transmitted to Perry
(Exhibits P-5, P-6 , P-7 , P-19).

(2) The fact that this

property was not deeded to Sterling company as requested by
Rudd's letter of May 11, 1982 (Exhibit P-10).

(3) Carolyn

went to the Draper State Bank on November 25, T985, which
was after the time it was discovered that the 2140 acres in
question were not on the Exhibit "A" in the divorce court
file, with the intention and expectation she would receive
$11,000.00 for back child support and alimony and $3,500*00
in lieu of the Lehi property she did not receive (due to a
title defect) from the letter of credit for $90,000.00 that
bank gave to Gurr and his partner in lieu of a supersedeas
bond while he appealed the judgment in question to the Utah
Supreme Court.

(4) Carolyn told Perry, Eric Bennion and

Joseph Sanchez after November 1, 1985 and prior to November
25, 1985, that she was not changing her demand due to
learning that the 2140 acres were not listed on the Court's
Exhibit MAIf.

(5) Carolyn told Perry that hefd better give

her some money soon as she was about to "cave in11 to
pressures at a time just before Christmas of 1985 when she
was in financial distress (R. 136, P. 44, 45).
2.

DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY MOT DISPOSED OF BY

THE DIVORCE DECREE
Was the subject property distributed in the
divorce decree and if so to whom?

Since the decree itself

expressly stated that Carolyn was to receive "none" of the
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real property, the subject property was awarded to Perry if
it was awarded to anyone.
The problem is it was not listed on the Exhibit
"A" to the divorce decree that presumably listed all
property awarded to Perry.
If it was not awarded to either party, then it
must be distributed now.
Sec. 30-3-5(3) U.C.A. 1953 provides as follows:
The court has continuing
jurisdiction to make subsequent changes
or new orders for the support and
maintenance of the parties, the custody
of the children and their support,
maintenance, health, and dental care, or
the distribution of the property as is
reasonable and necessary.
Since the real property from which the judgment in
question was derived was not in fact distributed by the
divorce decree, then the property produced by it (the
judgment entered in Utah County in case No. 50224)
necessarily must be distributed at this time in order that
the judgment might be satisfied by the proper party.

The

1882 case of Whitmore v. Harden, 3 U. 121, 1 P. 465, held
that the right of the Court to modify any order for
distribution of property does not necessarily apply to the
identical property held at the time of the divorce but
generally as to any property held by the party against whom
the modification is sought.
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The parties at the time of their divorce owed far
more in debts than they had assets (Appendix A, Par. 6,
Rudd, P. 35). Even so, all the real property assets not
involved in litigation went to Carolyn or her children
(Carolyn, R. 144, P. 20 and 21; Swan, R. 141, P. 5; Exhibit
10-P).
same.

The situation now in this regard is essentially the
Faced with minimal income which is irregular, the

debts from the marriage hang over Perry's head (Exhibit
1-P).

It is clearly equitable that this asset be

distributed to him to assist in the liquidation of those
debts including a substantial amount for unpaid support
money due Carolyn ($4,900.00 as of the trial date) (Exhibit
1-D).

Furthermore, to award that property or its

replacement to her is not to benefit her but Gurr, who paid
absolutely nothing for it.
3.

See pages of this Brief supra.

CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES

Sec. 30-3-5-O) U.C.A. 1953 quoted above expressly
applies to property awards as well as other aspects of
divorce such as alimony, support money and custody.
In the case of Foulger v. Foulger, 626 P2d 412
(Utah, 1981) the Court pointed out that such modifications
should be done "only with great reluctance and based on
compelling reasons."
Another applicable case is that of Becker v.
Becker, 694 P2d 608 (Utah, 1984).

There the Court

emphasized the principle that the change of circumstances
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must relate to that aspect of the decree that is being
modified (there the custodial aspects).
Perry's case clearly meets both the compelling
reasons test of Foulger and the relationship of changed
circumstances to the aspect to be modified test of Becker,
It is hard to imagine a more drastic change of
circumstances than for one to possess a half interest in a
piece of property or a judgment that is worth several
thousand dollars and then to lose it for nothing in return.
Is such modification doing an injustice to Gurr?
Certainly it would deprive him of an enormous profit from
his December 19, 1985 purchase which he could applv to the
judgment against him if Carolyn had the interest he claims
for her.
11

But would that be unfair?

investment11 knowing the risks?

Did he not make his

Surely his attorney must

have told him of the risks recognized by the other
attorneys involved.

Rudd said "I didn't believe anybody

would purchase her interests" and

,f

too good to be true that

anybody would actually come along and pay money for that to
the tune of what I thought might be of val\ie to her"
(Appendix A, Par. 6, Rudd, P. 15-16).

Swan said "and Lee

and I pretty well agreed there would have to be a further
hearing, in effect a supplemental hearing to the divorce"
(Swan, R. 141, P. 13). These proceedings are the hearing
referred to by Swan and the statute set forth above makes
it clear that any such purchase would be subject to the
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continuing jurisdiction of the Court.

Certainly Gurr was

no bona fide purchaser without notice of Perry's claim.

No

one could have been a bona fide purchaser of the judgment
because neither the subject property nor the judgment in
question were awarded to Carolyn in the divorce decree (R.
34-38) .
The equities between a modification that will
benefit one whose work and toil created an asset he
preserved through two district court trials and an appeal
to the Utah Sxipreme Court and the denial of that
modification for someone who literally bought "something
for nothing11 seems too self evident to require any further
argument.
4.

ATTORNEY'S FEES

The rationale for awarding attorney's fees in
divorce cases is set forth in Sec. 589 of "Divorce and
Separation" in 24 Am. Jur• 2d 594 as follows:
"Suit money," which includes
counsel fees, may be defined as the
money necessary to enable a spouse to
carry on or defend a matrimonial
action. The rules that govern the
allowance of suit money, including
attorney fees, are ordinarily the same
as those that govern the allowance of
temporary alimony. It has been said
that in suits for divorce it is usual to
award, in addition to what a spouse may
be entitled to as costs, a sum of money
sufficient to prosecute or defend the
suit in an efficient manner to a final
hearing, and that such allowances are
absolutely essential to the proper
assertion of marital rights which a
spouse might be unable to establish if
-22-

the other spouse were not required to
assist in this regard. The right to
suit money for the purpose of enabling a
spouse to protect rights exists even
though the sum awarded ultimately
belongs to an attorney,
A limitation thereon is set forth in the following
section as follows at page 599:
If the proceeding wherein the
services were rendered does not involve
marital rights, the dependent spouse is
not entitled to an allowance to
compensate the attorney.
In this instance we have exactly such a
situation.

Carolyn1s marital rights, if any, in the 2140

acres upon x^hich the money judgment against Gurr came into
existence were established by the divorce decree entered in
August, 1982, not by the action tried on November 5, 1986.
The legal services performed by James Brown, the
attorney who represented Gurr in the purchase of Carolyn!s
interest, if any, in the judgment against Gurr in the
action in question benefited only Gurr and not Carolyn at
all.
It was known at the outset, that is at the time of
the assignment of any rights in the subject judgment which
occurred on December 18, 1985, that fees for legal services
would be borne by Gurr not Carolyn.

This was so obviously

the lawyer and sellers intention that it was not even
discussed.

As to that understanding the deposition of Gurr

at page 16 (R. 139) reads as follows:
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Q.

(By Mr. Hansen) All right. Did she
have any obligation to pay anv fees
in connection with claims that were
being assigned to you?

A.

I don't know what her deal was with
her attorney, and she didn't have
any agreement with me on anything
that she would be held for payment.
It wasn't even discussed.

Q.

But let's put it this way. You
didn't expect her, did you, to pay
any legal expense that you would
have in pursuing a claim she was
assigning to you?

A.

No. I'll handle these here expenses
on that document that we bought her
deal (indicating).

Q.

And that includes attorney's fees?

A.

It should do.

Even when the award of attorney's fees are proper
the allowance of them is discretionarv.

See Sec. 591

"Discretion of Court" 24 Am. Jur. 2d 596 which reads inter
alia as follows:
Whether an allowance of suit money
and counsel fees shall be made in the
case at bar rests in the judicial
discretion of the court, to be exercised
in view of the conditions and
circumstances of each case. Abuse of
discretion is necessarily subject to
review;
* *

*

While the allowance of suit money
or attorney fees is within the
discretion of the court, the power
should not be exercised unless a spouse
establishes a prima facie right thereto
(Citation omitted).
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In the instant case an award of any amount was not
proper since no benefit to Carolyn was involved.

Even if

some marital ripjit were involved to some extent the award
was an abuse of discretion under all the circumstances of
this case.
X.

CONCLUSION

The divorce decree should be modified by amending
Exhibit "A" thereof to conform to all the copies thereof
that Perry ever saw and the decree should expressly award
all interest in the judgment of April 19, 1983 to Perry on
the basis of either reformation, distribution of
undistributed property or on the basis of changed
circumstances (sale of December 19, 1985) to do equity
under all the circumstances.

Also the award of $6,750.00

attorney's fees should be vacated as those fees should be
paid by Gurr, the sole beneficiary thereof.
Respectfully submitted this 12th day of January,
1989.

Robert B. Hansen
Attorney for Appellant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that I mailed two true and correct
copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to Attorney for
Respondent addressed to James R. Brown, Attorney at Law,
370 East South Temple, Suite 401 , Salt Lake City, Utah
84111, this 12th day of January, 1989.

Robert B. Hansen
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APPENDIX A

STATE OF UTAH

)
)ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

Robert B. Hansen, being first duly sworn upon his oath,
deposes and says:
1.

He is counsel for defendant in the case of Fitzgerald v.

Fitzgerald, D81-3721.
2.

The deposition of Lee Rudd who represented the plaintiff

in said case at the time of the parties divorce in 1982 and until the
present proceeding began was deposed in said case on the 5th day of
iMay, 1986.
3.

In the instant proceedings counsel of the parties

stipulated that the deposition transcript of the said Lee Rudd,
though unsigned, should be part of the evidence in this case subject
to objection as to relevancy (R. 136, P. 3 ) .
4.

The preparation of the record in this case was delayed

when said deposition transcript and others could not be located (R.
145).
5.

After all due diligence the transcript of Lee Rudd's

deposition has not been located, hence this affidavit.
6.

The following are exact quotations of the testimony of

the said Lee Rudd taken from affiant's copy of said transcript:

i

Page 15, line 8 through Page 16, line 3:
Q.

Didn't you make a notation somewhere in your
records as to what the opening offer was?

A.

I could have. There were—initially I would
have heard from Carolyn; and whether I wrote
it down—to be honest with you, I guess I
thought that it was, initially w a s — I didn't
believe anybody would purchase her interests.

Q.

Why is that?

A.

I guess
be true
and pay
thought

Q.

Was the amount increased as a result of your
negotiations?

A.

I don't believe that amount was increased. I
wish I could remember even what it was. I
think that it was more of talking what
Carolyn's warranties or protections, interests
of what she was conveying. That was the main
discussions that we had. And, as I remember,
that was the main redrafting of the document.
It wasn't, as I recall, from Day One that she
said, "Well, I won't sell for this price," or
"I've got to have more money." That was never
the obstacles.

I thought it was too good a thing to
that anybody would actually come along
money for that to the tune of what I
might be of value to her.

Page 16, lines 4-12:
Q.

The final agreement makes it very clear that
she didn't warrant that she had any interest?

A.

That was what I was attempting to do in the
thing. I think there are some warranties,
although it says not in some ways. But I
think there were some inherent, and—but—the
main thing, we didn't understand a great deal
of what the judgment was, and it had never
really been to the Supreme Court. I think I
read the order, but it was in the process. We
didn't know what was out there.

ii

Page 32, line 12 through Page 33, line 1:
Q.

Now with respect to your Exhibit "E" to that
affidavit, your letter dated May 11 to me
where you propose that Carolyn execute an
assignment and quitclaim of any interests she
has in the property or the results of your
suit to the Sterling company, was that ever
done?

A.

Which one, now?

Q.

Second paragraph.

A.

Which part?

Q.

Right in the middle.

Are you in the letter?

"I would propose."

(Witness examines.)
Q.

It's the third sentence.

A.

I don't recall if that was ever actually
done. There was an assignment and quitclaim
deeds to the Sterling company and to the
trust. As to whether one was for that
particular one, I'm not sure.

Page 35, lines 10-16:
Q.

In her deposition I represent to you that
Carolyn's recollection was that the
liabilities exceeded the assets. Is that your
recollection also?

A.

I suppose that that would have a great deal of
bearing on what value you put on the assets,
but it would be my testimony that the
liabilities far exceeded the assets, yes.

7.

Attached hereto is a certified copy of the order which

consolidated the case which is the subject matter of this appeal with
Case No. C86-551.

This is to tie in with the record cited on page 10

of this brief.

iii

Dated this 11th day of January, 1989.

Robert B. Hansen

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

day of January, 1989.

Notary Public
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah
My Commission Expires:
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320 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
322-5804
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PERRY G. FITZGERALD,
STIPULATION FOR AND ORDER

Plaintiff,

OF CONSOLIDATION

vs.

D8J-3721 with this case
C£86£55T}

KEITH L. GURR and DRAPER
BANK & TRUST COMPANY

Judge;

Defendant

James Sawaya

STIPULATION
Comes now the parties hereto through their undersigned counsel
and stipulate and agree that the order set forth below should be entered
pursuant to Rule 42, URCP because of the questions of law and fact that
are common to both actions.
Dated this

$**

day of

l\priV^{9S6.

JA|E#-fW-BRQWttf
Attorney for above defendants and for
Carolyn Knepper, p l a i n t i f f in D81-3721
ORDER
Upon reading the above stipulation and good cause appearing
therefore
IT IS ORDERED that this case and the case of D81-3721 be

consblId*ted for the purpose of trying the issues now pending in these
two cases.
Dated this

day of April, 1986.

BY THE COURT

J U D G E

ATTEST
H. DIXON HINDLEY
CI**

ByS„, \ \Wir\v\-' , ' \ ^
$t>"ty Clerk

' CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF ABORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIRr
DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF
UTAH

*6fdnHrriTfor Difindaiit
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake C i t y , Utah 84111
Telephone:
(801) 532-7700

•">

\jw

:.r--jTY CLERK

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH
PERRY G. FITZGERALD,
Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.
KEITH L. GURR and DRAPER
BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
Defendant.
KEITH L. GURR,
Plaintiff/
Counterclaimant,

)
)
)

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF GURRfS MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)
)
)

VS.

PERRY G. FITZGERALD,
ROBERT B . HANSEN, and
SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF,
Defendants.

)
)
)

Civil No. C 86-551
Judge James S. Sawaya

)

COMES NOW Defendant Gurr by and through counsel of
record, James R. Brown, Esq. of Jardine, Linebaugh, Brown &
Dunn and submits the following Memorandum in Support of his
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

1.

On

May

4, 1982, Perry

Fitzgerald

and Carolyn

Fitzgerald were awarded a Judgment against Gurr and Corbett in
the Utah County Case No. 50224, ordering Corbett and Gurr to
return an Apartment Building.
2.

Subsequently it was determined that the Apartment

Complex could not be returned and a money judmgnet was rendered
in favor of Perry and Carolyn Fitzgerald on April 19, 1983.
3.

Corbett and Gurr filed an Appeal on the Judgment

in 50224 which Appeal was decided on November 1, 1985, in favor
of Perry and Carolyn Fitzgerald.
4.

Gurr purchased the interest of Carolyn Fitzgerald

(now Carolyn Knepper) on December 19, 1985, of her one-half of
the Judgment in 50224, some past due child support due from
Perry to Carolyn in the amount of $10,440.00, attorney fees in
the amount of $2,886.22 and a claim of $7,000 arising out of
the property settlement of the divorce.
5.

Gurr caused to be tendered to Plaintiff and/or

Plaintifffs counsel the following:
A.

All attorney fees of $36,598.00;

B.

Satisfaction of the past due child

support

Judgment and attorney fees, and real property claim
which totalled $23,077.95;
C.

The payment of $15,135.23 to Perry Fitzgerald;

D.

And coupled with the interest previously owned

by Carolyn Knepper, the entire judgment in Case No.
50224.

#V JM**?t>«flt:

to

tbm taff ir»ance.

Defendant

Gutr

tendered on three occasions full satisfaction of the Judgment:
A.

January 17, 1986 in person to B. Hansen;

B.

January 21, 1986 hand delivery to B. Hansen;

C.

January 21, 1986 hand delivery to B. Hansen at

Sheriff's Sale.
7.

On 9-16-81 Carolyn Knepper filed for a Divorce

against Perry Fitzgerald under Case No. D81-3721 in Salt Lake
County.
8.

That the parties had acquired a number of parcels

of real property during the term of the marriage.
9.

Prior to the Divorce

action, Robert B. Hansen

represented both Perry and Carolyn Fitzgerald in the pending
Utah County Case No. 50224.
10.

Negotiations

were

commenced

to

effectuate

a

settlement between the parties and to this end Exhibit "A"
attached hereto is a proposed Settlement Agreement which was
drafted in February, 1981.
11.

On

May

4,

1982,

Judge

Bullock

rendered

his

decision in Case No. 50224, a copy of which is hereto attached
as Exhibit "B".
12.

On May 5, 1982f Robert B. Hansen called Lee Rudd

who was counsel for Carolyn Knepper and advised him of Judge
Bullock's ruling.
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B* B&naen who vas representing Perry Fitzgerald in the Divorce
matter

asserting

that

Carolyn

wanted

an

interest

in the

Corbett-Gurr property and/or judgment, a copy of said letter is
attached hereto as Exhibit "C11.
14.

In

response

thereto, Robert

B. Hansen wrote a

letter to Mr. Rudd, a copy of which is hereto attached as
Exhibit "D", wherein the Corbett-Gurr property is removed from
the Settlement Agreement as per Mr. Hansen's request.
15.
executed

by

Agreement

On

June

Perry

8r

1982, the

Fitzgerald

specifically

and

changes

Settlement
Carolyn
the

Agreement

Fitzgerald

Awarding

of

is

which
the

"Corbett-Gurr" property to Perry. (Exhibit "E").
16.

On August 4, 1982, after reviewing the proposed

Findings of Fact and Decree, Mr. Hansen executed and delivered
to Mr. Rudd a Consent to Default Judgment and Waiver, Exhibit
"F".
17.

On July 2, 1983, and again on August 6, 1983, Mr.

Hansen wrote to Mr. Rudd to update him on the Corbett-Gurr
matter.
18.

In early November, 1985, Mr. Hansen advised Mr.

Rudd by telephone that the Judgment in the Corbett-Gurr matter
had been affirmed.
19.

On November 22, 1985, Mr. Rudd wrote to Mr. Hansen

about the distribution of the Corbett-Gurr Judgment, Exhibit
"G".
-4-

fferry Mid Cmrolyni
J g H i ^ W I * ^ ^

and

attorney

fees, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "H".
21.

Thereafter, Gurr purchased the one-half interest

of Carolyn Knepper, the Judgment

for past due support and

attorney fees and other claims.
22.

Gurr

tendered

full

satisfaction

and

finally

payment was made after an Order of this Court provided for
Satisfaction.
23.

Plaintiff

and

Plaintiff's

counsel

having

full

knowledge of all of the foregoing facts held a Sheriff's sale
on January 21, 1986.

remove

24.

Gurr has had to incur costs and attorney fees to

the

Sheriff's

sale and to

secure

execution

of the

Satisfaction, Exhibit "F" to the Findings of Fact heretofore
made by this Court.
25.

During these proceedings, Defendant Gurr has been

denied credit as a result of the Sheriff's sale, and has lost
two potential sales of real property because of the Sheriff's
sale on two parcels "sold at said Sheriff's sale."
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THERE ARE NO MATERIAL ISSUES
OF FACT IN DISPUTE AND GURR IS
ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF SOUGHT
The Affidavit of Lee Rudd sets forth in detail the
negotiations, changes

and

Settlement

Custody

and

Child

Carolyn Fitzgerald

final

execution

Agreement

of

the

between

in the Divorce action.

Property

Perry

and

It is undisputed

that:
A.

In

the

initial

negotiations

Perry

was

to

receive the Corbett-Gurr property;
B.

After May 4, 1982, (the date of ruling) there

was a change wherein Carolyn wanted her share of the
Corbett-Gurr judgment;
C.

There

was

correspondence

between

the

respective counsel, May 11, 1982, Rudd to Hansen, and
June 1, 1982, from Hansen to Rudd;
D.

The

Corbett-Gurr

property

and

others

were

removed from Exhibit "A" to the Settlement Agreement;
E.

The parties executed the final Agreement with

the Corbett-Gurr matter removed.
Gurrfs

subsequent

purchase

of

Carolyn

Knepper1s

interest was a means of satisfying the Judgment.

Gurr is

entitled,

Judgment

as

a

matter

of

law

to

a

Declaratory

declaring that the one-half interest he purchased from Carolyn
Knepper is his and to quiet title to him of said interest.
-6-

If
PLAINTIFF SLANDERED
GURR'S TITLE
On January 21f 1986, in utter disregard of the tenders
of payment, Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel caused the Salt
Lake County Sheriff to conduct a sale of certain of Mr. Gurr's
real property.

This sale was done at a point in time when

Plaintiff knew:
A.

Gurr owned one-half of the Judgment;

B.

Gurr had tendered the remaining payment.

The sale placed a cloud on the title and was done for
the sole purpose of causing Gurr damage and injury.

There can

be no other basis for the Sheriff's Sale inasmuch as full
payment had earlier been tendered.

To add further evidence of

the bad faith of Plaintiff, Plaintiff refused to execute the
Satisfaction of Judgment heretofore ordered by the Court.
Under § 38-9-1 et seq. the Legislature provided a
penalty for wrongfully claiming "an interest in, or a lien or
encumbrance against, real property . . .".
sale, by not

satisfying

the Judgment

Plaintiff, by the

subjected

himself to

damaged of $1000 or treble actual damages, whichever is greater
and for reasonable attorney's fees.
Mr. Gurr has incurred attorney fees and costs of this
action for the blatant and willful clouding of his title to the
real property.
-7-

Ill
CHAMPERTY DOES NOT LIE
AGAINST MR. GURR
Mr. Gurr had an express right to satisfy the Judgment
in 50224 by paying one of the joint owners of the judgment a
sum for her interest.

It is well stated in 14 Am.Jur. 2d P.

848 § 10 Champerty and Maintenance which provides in part:
The common-law doctrine of champerty
and maintenance has been relaxed so that the
bona fide assignee of a chose in action or a
judgment can generally sue in any court of
law or equityf the defendant retaining all
legal or equitable defenses that he might
have asserted against the assignor.
The cases cited under the foregoing are dispositive of this
matter.

In Holmes v. Clark 274 Ky. 349, 118 SW2d 758 the court

declared that the outright purchase of the entire beneficial
interest in a chose of action is deemed to be free from the
taint of champerty.

They went

further

to distinguish the

situation wherein advancement is made to aid prosecution of a
claim in exchange for a share of the proceeds.
Gurr
Knepper.

purchased

outright

the

interest

Carolyn

He is not sharing the proceeds with anyone.

litigation was completed before his purchase.
to satisfy the adverse judgment.
interest

of

The

He simply wanted

Plaintiff asserts some secret

in the one-half owned by Carolyn Knepper and then

accuses Gurr of champerty.

If any champerty and/or maintenance

has occurred it is on the part of Plaintiff.
-8-

IV
INTEREST IS APPROPRIATE
AS A MATTER OF LAW
Plaintiff

asserts

that

there

should

not

be

any

interest assessed him on:
A.

The Judgment for past due child support and

attorney fees;
B.

And on the claim for $7,000.

Plaintiff does not deny the validity of both the Judgment and
the claim.
Under 15-1-4 UCA, the Legislature provided:
Any judgment . . . shall bear interest
at the rate of 12% per annum.
In the case of Dairy Distributors Inc. v. Local Union 976, 16
U.2d

85, 396

P. 2d

47, our

court declared

that

under the

provisions of 15-1-4 UCA, interest as provided in the statute
follows

the

judgment

as

a

matter

of

law

and

would

be

collectible even though the judgment did not so provide.
Under 15-1-1 UCA, the Legislature provided in part:
Except
when parties to a lawful
contract agree on a specified rate of
interest, the legal rate of interest for the
loan or forebearance of any money, goods, or
chose in action shall be 10% per annum.
The parties, Perry and Carolyn Fitzgerald, did not agree or
specify * any rate of interest, therefore 10% is the rate of
interest due to Carolyn Knepper (now Gurr) on the forebearance
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of the adaittfrd f7,000 due to her.

The following is therefore

the calculation of interest on both the Judgment and the $7,000
claim:
Judgment
Child Support
Attorney fees
TOTAL JUDGMENT

$10,440.50
2,886.22
$13,326.22

Interest § 12% = $4.38 per day
Interest from December 5, 1985 to
March 6, 1986 = 90 days = $394.20
Total Judgment with interest = $13,720.42
Interest on $7,000 Claim
Carolyn received a Deed for property dated June 8,
1982.
The property was to be free and clear but was
encumbered by a prior agreement in favor of Angell.
$7,000 @ 10% interest from June 8, 1982 to March 6,
1986 is 3 years, 8 months, and 26 days or $2,616.56.
Interest

on

the

50224

Judgment

is

calculated

as

follows:
Principal of Judgment =
interest from 3-6-78 to 5-14-81 = $11,822.21
interest from 5-14-81 to 4-19-83 = 11,994.61
$23,876.82
interest from 4-19-83 to 1-21-86 =
Sub total through 1-21-86
Less credits from Executions
Net due as of 1-21-86

$ 62,100.00
23,876.82
85,976.82
28,322.88
$114,300.70
1,000.00
$113,300.70

Amounts Paid
Total Judgment 1-21-86
Attorney fees to Robert Hansen
One-half to Carolyn
Credit to Judgment
Credit to $7,000 claim
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$ 1 1 3 , 3 0 0 . .70
3 6 , 5 9 8 , .70
7 6 , 7 0 2 , .70
3 8 , 3 5 1 , .35
3 8 , 3 5 1 ,.35
$ 1 3 , 7 2 0 ,.42
8 , 6 1 6 .56
23,336.98

Utt fe* » T i n g p
Aaotuit paid to Perry
Over payment due to Gurr

15 , 014 .37
15,135.23
120.86

CONCLUSION
Gurr is entitled to the following Judgment:
A.

Declaratory Judgment in his favor establishing

that one-half

of the judgment

in 50224 belonged to

Carolyn Knepper and now Keith L. Gurr;
B.

A

Decree

quieting

title

to

certain

property and for damages of $1000 or treble
damages, whichever
costs

against

real
actual

is greater, and attorney fees and

Fitzgerald

and

Hansen

jointly

and

severally;
C.

For Summary Judgment in favor of Gurr denying

any relief for Plaintiff for champerty;
D.

For

Judgment

against

Defendant

Perry

Fitzgerald in the amount of $120.86;
E.

Reserving only the cause of action for offset

on the pending Fourth District Court ..matter.
DATED this

(7

day of fypfii, 1986.
/
//JARDINE/^INEBAUGH,

BRpfW& DUNN

y
0^oTn€jsfo'r
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Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OP GURR1S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed by United States mail, postage
prepaid, on this

X

day of April, 1986, and addressed to

the following:
Robert B. Hansen
Attorney at Law
320 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

JRB-P235
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l CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIRD
DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF
UTAH.

/ / /???
~£
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DEPU"T'v COU
DOURT CLERK

